

**TOP SECRET**

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Director's Meeting

Tuesday, 13 May 1952

PRESENT: General Smith, Messrs. Dulles, Wisner, Wolf, Becker,  
Hedden,

General Smith:

a. Noted that he had received a call from General McAuliffe concerning possible candidates for chief of para-military training activities and briefly discussed the qualifications of those mentioned in this conversation. (NOTE: No decision on this matter has been reached to date.)

Mr. Dulles:

a. Noted he had received a letter from Senator Douglas enclosing a copy of a paper prepared by Joliot-Curie alleging U. S. participation in BW against the North Koreans.

b. Left with the Director a copy of the paper prepared by the Princeton Panel discussed at yesterday's deputies' meeting concerning U. S. policies and objectives toward the satellites.

c. Reported on the discussion he and some of our people had with certain State officials yesterday and noted that State had raised the following points.

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Mr. Dulles (Cont'd.)

(3) [ ] flight. In this connection Mr. Dulles noted that State did not take a positive position on this but did indicate they would give us an immediate answer if and when the matter was put to them. The Director stated that State's only consideration in this matter was whether or not such a flight would affect any vital political questions now under discussion and that the tactical necessity pertaining to this flight was the sole responsibility of CIA. Mr. Dulles also stated that [ ] had briefed those present of certain of our operational activities in the Far East.

Mr. Wolf:

a. Stated he had discussed with Messrs. Schaub and Reynolds our new building and Schaub had advised he was "putting in" a figure of \$34,000,000. In this connection Mr. Wolf noted that the site discussed at a previous deputies' meeting appeared to be acceptable to both Schaub and Reynolds, and we could in all probability acquire the property and will accomplish the necessary construction for about \$31,000,000.

b. Stated that the Army had asked that Colonel Edwards be returned. After some discussion the Director authorized Mr. Wolf to request that Edwards be retained until his retirement (June, 1954), at which time he could occupy one of our exempted slots for retired military personnel.

c. [ ] Noted he believed we had a good man to head our [ ] program, and after some discussion the Director stated that Major General [ ] and would be an excellent choice to head our [ ] program. Mr. Wolf undertook to look into this matter.

Mr. Wisner:

a. [ ] Noted that we had received several cables from [ ] concerning the alleged statement made by Admiral Fechteler that war was inevitable. After some discussion the Director (1) called Mr. Ley who stated that Admiral Fechteler made no such report to the National Security Council; (2) undertook to call Admiral Fechteler and if assurance was received from him that the statement in question had not in fact been made would [ ]

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Mr. Wisner (Cont'd.)

b. Noted that we had received the first trickle of information on the elections in Panama and so far these elections appear comparatively quiet.

c. Stated that the Director's recent letter to General Ridgway had arrived after his departure. DCI stated it should be given to

d. Stated that  had raised the question of combating Soviet propaganda in Vienna, and after some discussion the Director stated we should ask him how we could assist in this matter.

Mr. Becker:

a. Stated that (1) there were only two items on the agenda for the IAC Meeting on 15 May, one of which was Berlin coordination; (2) he had asked for a "round-up" on the Berlin situation. In this connection the Director asked Mr. Wisner to send a cable to our people  asking them for their assessment as to the courses of action the Soviets might take between now and the time the German contractual agreements are signed.

